Archive for the ‘Debugging’ Category

A BSWAP Issue

Saturday, November 7th, 2009

The BSWAP instruction is very handy when you want to convert a big endian value to a little endian value and vice versa. Instead of reversing the bytes yourself with a few moves (or shifts, depends how you implement it), a single instruction will do it as simple as that. It personally reminds me something like the HTONS (and friends) in socket programming. The instruction supports 32 bits and 64 bits registers. It will swap (reverse) all bytes inside correspondingly. But it won’t work for 16 bits registers. The documentation says the result is undefined. Now WTF, what was the issue to support 16 bits registers, seriously? That’s a children’s game for Intel, but instead it’s documented to be undefined result. I really love those undefined results, NOT.
When decoding a stream in diStorm in 16 bits decoding mode, BSWAP still shows the registers as 32 bits. Which, I agree can be misleading and I should change it (next ver). Intel decided that this instruction won’t support 16 bits registers, and yet it will stay a legal instruction, rather than, say, raising an exception of undefined instruction, there are known cases already when a specific destination register can cause to an undefined instruction exception, like MOV CR5, EAX, etc. It’s true that it’s a bit different (because it’s not the register index but the decoding mode), but I guess it was easier for them to keep it defined and behave weird. When I think of it again, there are some instruction that don’t work in 64 bits, like LDS. Maybe it was before they wanted to break backward compatibility… So now I keep on getting emails to fix diStorm to support BSWAP for 16 bits registers, which is really dumb. And I have to admit that I don’t like this whole instruction in 16 bits, because it’s really confusing, and doesn’t give a true result. So what’s the point?

I was wondering whether those people who sent me emails regarding this issue were writing the code themselves or they were feeding diStorm with some existing code. The question is how come nobody saw it doesn’t work well for 16 bits? And what’s the deal with XCHG AH, AL, that’s an equal for BSWAP AX, which should work 100%. Actually I can’t remember whether compilers generate code that uses BSWAP, but I am sure I have seen the instruction being used with normal 32 bits registers, of course.

Integer Promotion is Dodgey & Dangerous

Wednesday, October 28th, 2009

I know this subject and every time it surprises me again. Even if you know the rules of how it works and you read K&R, it will still confuse you and you will end up being wrong in some cases. At least, that’s what happened to me. So I decided to mention the subject and to give two examples along.

Integer promotions probably happen in your code so many times, and most of us are not even aware of that fact and don’t understand the way it works. To those of you who have no idea what integer promotion is, to make a long story short: “Objects of an integral type can be converted to another wider integral type (that is, a type that can represent a larger set of values). This widening type of conversion is called “integral promotion.”, cited by MSDN. Why? So calculation can be faster in some of the times, otherwise because of different types; so seamless conversions happen, etc. There are exact rules in the standard how it works and when, you should check it out on your own

enum {foo_a = -1, foo_b} foo_t;

unsigned int a = -1;
printf("%s", a == foo_a ? "true" : "false");

Can you tell what it prints?
It will print “true”. Nothing special right, just works as we expect?
Check the next one out:

unsigned char a = -1;
printf("%s", a == foo_a ? "true" : "false");

And this time? This one will result in “false”. Only because the type of ‘a’ is unsigned. Therefore it will be promoted to unsigned integer – 0x000000ff, and compare it to 0xffffffff, which will yield false, of course.
If ‘a’ were defined as signed, it would be ok, since the integer promotions would make sure to sign extend it.

Another simple case:

unsigned char a = 5, b = 200;
unsigned int c = a * b;
printf("%d", c);

Any idea what the result is? I would expect it to be (200*5) & 0xff – aka the low byte of the result, since we multiply uchars here, and you? But then I would be wrong as well. The result is 1000, you know why? … Integer Promotions, ta da. It’s not like c = (unsigned char)(a * b); And there is what confusing sometimes.
Let’s see some Assembly then:

movzx       eax,byte ptr [a]
movzx       ecx,byte ptr [b]
imul        eax,ecx
mov         dword ptr [c],eax

Nasty, the unsigned char variables are promoted to unsigned int. Then the multiplication happens in 32 bits operand size! And then the result is not being truncated, just like that, to unsigned char again.

Why is it dangerous? I think the answer is obvious.. you trivially expect for one result when you read/write the code, but in reality something different happens. Then you end up with a small piece of code that doesn’t do what you expect it to. And then you end up with some integer overflow vulnerability without slightly noticing. Ouch.

Update: Thanks to Daniel I changed my erroneous (second) example to what I really had in mind when I wrote this post.

VML + ANI ZERT Patches

Tuesday, February 3rd, 2009

It is time to release an old presentation about the VML and ANI vulnerabilities that were patched by ZERT. It explains the vulnerabilities and how they were closed. It is somewhat very technical, Assembly is required if you wanna really enjoy it. I also gave a talk using this presentation in CCC 2007. It so happened that I wrote the patches, with the extensive help of the team, of course.

ZERT Patches.ppt

Oh No, My XPSP3

Monday, February 2nd, 2009
#include <windows.h>
int main()
{
 WCHAR c[1000] = {0};
 memset(c, 'c', 1000);
 SystemParametersInfo(SPI_SETDESKWALLPAPER, 0, (PVOID)c, 0);

 WCHAR b[1000] = {0};
 SystemParametersInfo(SPI_GETDESKWALLPAPER, 1000, (PVOID)b, 0);
 return 0;
}

Two posts ago I talked about vulnerabilities. So here’s some Zero Day. This will crash your system, unless you’re on Vista (which is already immune to it). And why the heck on SP3 we are still having this thing not closed yet?

It might be exploitable, I didn’t research it any further than the BSOD of the security cookie…Maybe on some compilations without /GS it can be easily exploited. Or maybe overriding enough of the stack to trigger an exception could be it.

“Remember to let her into your heart,
Then you can start to make it better” – The Beatles.

Escape

Sunday, February 1st, 2009

Wanted to share this with the world:

e 0:0 cc
e 100 c4 c4 54 27

NULL, Vulnerabilities and Fuzzing

Wednesday, December 31st, 2008

I remember seeing Ilja at BH07. We talked about Kernel attacks, aka privilege escalation. He told me, also, back then, that he found some holes that he managed to execute code through. I think the platform of target was Windows, although Ilja is specializing in Unix. Back in ’05 already he had a talk about Unix Kernel Auditing. Nothing new probably there, at least for the time being. However, the new approach of fuzzing the kernel, the system calls to be accurate, was pretty new. But feel free to correct me if I’m wrong about it. And it seems Ilja managed to find some holes using fuzzing. (BTW, a much more interesting paper from him about Unusual Bugs.)

Personally, I don’t believe in fuzzing. Usually the holes I find – there is no way a fuzzer will find. Although, I do believe that you need to mix tools/knowledge in order to find holes and audit a software in a better way. It is enough that there is a simple validation of some parameter you pass to a specific potential-hole’y function and all your test can be thrown away because of that validation, though, there is still a weakness in that function, you won’t get to it. Then you say “Ah Uh”, and you think that you can refine the randomness of the parameters you pass to that function and hopefully prevail. Well, it might work, it might not. As I said, I’m not a big fan of fuzzing.

Although, it might be cool to have a tool that analyzes the code of a function and builds the parameters in a special way to make a code coverage of 100% on that function, which is not fuzzing anymore and means: you walk all paths of execution and the chances to find a weakness are so much greater. Writing such a tool is crazyness, and yet possible, if you ask me.

Fuzzing or not, there are still weaknesses in Win32k, which supposed to be one of the most “secured”/audited components in the Kernel. Probably because many researches had their work on it as well. And that’s simply sad.

Speaking about Ilja’s fuzzing of kernel and stuff, and thinking we are cool to find weaknesses nowadays, Mark Russinovich wrote NTCrash back in ’96 for god sake and, it was a Fuzzer(!), but back then nobody called it or knew about fuzzers. And NTCrash as simple as it is, found some weaknesses in kernel system calls of NT4 ;) Respect (though today it won’t even scratch the kernel, so we might think ourselves cool for still finding stuff :) ).

A friend and I are trying to audit another application, and my friend found some NULL dereference which crashes that software. So we fired up Olly and tried to see what’s going on. It seems that some interface is queried and returns a successful code value and at the same time we get NULL for that interface, which means something is really f*cked up there. Thing is, as you probably can imagine for yourself, we want to execute code out of it. But odds seem to be against us at this time, since we can’t control that NULL or anything about it.

I then wanted to see what people have done with NULL before, how to exploit it better. And usually 99% of the applications running out there don’t have page 0 mapped to their address space. But CSRSS and NTVDM for instance, do have it mapped, but who cares now…? It doesn’t help our cause. Besides, you probably can’t control that page 0 and its data anyway. So I encountered that Flash Exploitation. To be honest, I didn’t read all of the white paper about the exploitation, I only looked for how the arbitary data write worked. And it seems that some CALLOC had failed to allocate memory because of an integer overflow weakness and from there you got a NULL pointer to begin with. But Flash didn’t access that pointer immediately – it had some pointer arithmetic added to it. And you guessed it right, you can control some offset before the pointer is really accessed, thus you can write (almost) anywhere you want. Now I really don’t underestimate the exploitation, from the bits I read it is a crazy and very beautiful exploitation. But to say that it is a new technique and a new class of exploitation is one thing that I really don’t agree to. You know what, looking at it in a different light – it was probably not leading to a code execution if that CALLOC not returned NULL, because then you won’t know where you are on the heap and you couldn’t really write to anywhere you knew accurately. And besides, the NULL wasn’t dererferenced directly and an offset was added to it (no matter what the calculation was for the sake of conversation), so therefore I don’t see it so exciting if you ask me (again, not the exploitation but the “new class of exploitation”). Still you should check it out :)

So, as I saw that no one did anything really useful with a real NULL dereference, it seems that the weakness he found is only a DoS, but maybe we can control something there, yet to be researched…

Proxy Functions – The Right Way

Thursday, August 21st, 2008

As much as I am an Assembly freak, I try to avoid it whenever possible. It’s just something like “pick the right language for your project” and don’t use overqualified stuff. Actually, in the beginning, when I started my patch on the IPhone, I compiled a simple stub for my proxy and then fixed it manually and only then used that code for the patch. Just to be sure about something here – a proxy function is a function that gets called instead of the original function, and then when the control belongs to the proxy function it might call the original function or not.

The way most people do this proxy function technique is using detour patching, which simply means, that we patch the first instruction (or a few, depends on the architecture) and change it to branch into our code. Now mind you that I’m messing with ARM here – iphone… However, the most important difference is that the return address of a function is stored on a register rather than in the stack, which if you’re not used to it – will get you confused easily and experiencing some crashes.

So suppose my target function begins with something like:

SUB SP, SP, #4
STMFD SP!, {R4-R7,LR}
ADD R7, SP, #0xC

This prologue is very equivalent to push ebp; mov ebp, esp thing on x86, plus storing a few registers so we can change their values without harming the caller, of course. And the last thing, we also store LR (link-register), the register which stores the return address of the caller.

Anyhow, in my case, I override (detour) the first instruction to branch into my code, wherever it is. Therefore, in order my proxy function to continue execution on the original function, I have to somehow emulate that overriden instruction and only then continue from the next instruction as if the original patched function wasn’t touched. Although, there are rare times when you cannot override some specific instructions, but then it means you only have to work harder and change the way your detour works (instructions that use the program counter as an operand or branches, etc).

Since the return address of the caller is stored onto a register, we can’t override the first instruction with a branch-link (‘call’ equivalent on x86). Because then we would have lost the original caller’s return address. Give it a thought for a second, it’s confusing in the first time, I know. Just an interesting point to note that it so happens that if there’s a function which don’t call internally to other functions, it doesn’t have to store LR on the stack and later pop the PC (program-counter, IP register) off the stack, because nobody touched that register, unless the function needs around 14 registers for optimizations, instead of using local stack variables… This way you can tell which of the functions are leaves on the call graph, although it is not guaranteed.

Once we understand how the ARM architecture works we can move on. However, I have to mention that the 4 first parameters are passed on registers (R0 to R3) and the rest on the stack, so in the proxy we will have to treat the parameters accordingly. The good thing is that this ABI (Application-Binary-Interface) is something known to the compiler (LLVM with GCC front-end in my case), so you don’t have to worry about it, unless you manually write the proxy function yourself.

My proxy function can be written fully in C, although it’s possible to use C++ as well, but then you can’t use all features…

int foo(int a, int b)
{
 if (a == 1000) b /= 2;
}

That’s my sample foo proxy function, which doesn’t do anything useful nor interesting, but usually in proxies, we want to change the arguments, before moving on to the original function.

Once it is compiled, we can rip the code from the object or executable file, doesn’t really matter, and put it inside our patched file, but we are still missing the glue code. The glue code is a sequence of manually crafted instructions that will allow you to use your C code within the rest of the binary file. And to be honest, this is what I really wanted to avoid in first place. Of course, you say, “but you could write it once and then copy paste that glue code and voila”. So in a way you’re right, I can do it. But it’s bothersome and takes too much time, even that simple copy paste. And besides it is enough that you have one or more data objects stored following your function that you have to relocate all the references to them. For instance, you might have a string that you use in the proxy function. Now the way ARM works it is all get compiled as PIC (Position-Independent-Code) for the good and bad of it, probably the good of it, in our case. But then if you want to put your glue code inside the function and before the string itself, you will have to change the offset from the current PC register to the string… Sometimes it’s just easier to see some code:

stmfd sp!, {lr} 
mov r0, #0
add r0, pc, r0
bl _strlen
ldmfd sp! {pc}
db “this function returns my length :)”, 0

 When you read the current PC, you get that current instruction’s address + 8, because of the way the pipeline works in ARM. So that’s why the offset to the string is 0. Trying to put another instruction at the end of the function, for the sake of glue code, you will have to change the offset to 4. This really gets complicated if you have more than one resource to read. Even 32 bits values are stored after the end of the function, rather than in the operand of the instruction itself, as we know it on the x86.

So to complete our proxy code in C, it will have to be:

int foo(int a, int b)
{

 int (*orig_code)(int, int) = (int (*)(int, int))<addr of orig_foo + 4>; 
// +4 = We skip the first instruction which branches into this code!
 if (a == 1000) b /= 2;
// Emulate the real instruction we overrode, so stack is balanced before we continue with original function.
 asm(“sub sp, sp, #4”);
 return orig_foo(a, b);
}

This code looks more complete than before but contains a potential bug, can you spot it? Ok, I will give you a hint, if you were to use this code for x86, it would blow, though for ARM it would work well to some extent.

The bug lies in the number of arguments the original function receives. And since on ARM, only the 5th argument is passed through the stack, our “sub sp, sp, #4” will make some things go wrong. The stack of the original function should be as if it were running without we touched that function. This means that we want to push the arguments on the stack, ONLY then, do the stack fix by 4, and afterwards branch to the second instruction of the original function. Sounds good, but this is not possible in C. :( cause it means we have to run ‘user-defined’ code between the ‘pushing-arguments’ phase and the ‘calling-function’ phase. Which is actually not possible in any language I’m aware of. Correct me if I’m wrong though. So my next sentence is going to be “except Assembly”. Saved again ;)

Since I don’t want to dirty my hands with editing the binary of my new proxy function after I compile it, we have to fix that problem I just desribed above. This is the way to do it, ladies and gentlemen:

int foo(int a, int b)
{
 if (a == 1000) b /= 2;
 return orig_foo(a, b);
}

void __attribute__((naked)) orig_foo(int a, int b)
{
// Emulate the real instruction we overrode, so stack is balanced before we continue with original function.
 asm(“sub sp, sp, #4\nldr r12, [pc]\n bx r12\n.long <FOO ADDR + 4>”);
}

The code simply fixes the stack, reads the address of the original absolute foo address, again skipping the first instruction, and branches into that code. Though, it won’t change the return address in LR, therefore when the original function is over, it will return straight to the caller of orig_foo, which is our proxy function, that way we can still control the return values, if we wish to do so.

We had to use the naked attribute (__declspec(naked) in VC) so that the compiler won’t put a prologue that will unbalance our stack again. In any way the epilogue wouldn’t get to run…

This technique will work on x86 the same way, though for branching into an absolute address, one should use: push <addr>; ret.

In the bottom line, I don’t mind to pay the price for a few code lines in Assembly, that’s perfectly ok with me. The problem was that I had to edit the binary after compilation in order to fix it so it’s becoming ready to be put in the original binary as a patch. Besides, the Assembly code is a must, if you wish to compile it without further a do, and as long as the first instruction of the function hasn’t changed, your code is good to go.

This code works well and just as I really wanted, so I thought so share it with you guys, for a better “infrastructure” to make proxy function patches.

However, it could have been perfect if the compiler would have stored the functions in the same order you write them in the source code, thus the first instruction of the block would be the first instruction you have to run. Now you might need to add another branch in the beginning of the code so it skips the non-entry code. This is really compiler dependent. GCC seems to be the best in preserving the functions’ order. VC and LLVM are more problematic when optimizations are enabled. I believe I will cover this topic in the future.

One last thing, if you use -O3, or functions inline, the orig_foo naked function gets to be part of the foo function, and then the way we assume the original function returns to our foo proxy function, won’t happen. So just be sure to peek at the code so everything is fine ;)

Context of Execution (Meet Pyda)

Tuesday, August 5th, 2008

While I was writing an interactive console Python plugin for IDA pro I stumbled in a very buggy problem. The way a plugin works in IDA is that you supply 3 callbacks, init, run, term. You can guess which is called when. I just might put in that there are a few types of plugins and each type can be loaded in different times. I used, let’s say, a UI plugin which gets to run when you hit a hotkey. At that moment my run() function executes in the context of IDA’s thread. And only then I’m allowed to use all other data/code from IDA’s SDK. This is all good so far, and as it should be from such a plugin interface. So what’s wrong? The key idea behind my plugin is that it is an interactive Python console. Means that you have a console window which there you enter commands which eventually will be executed by the Python’s interpreter. Indirectly, this means that I create a thread with a tight loop that waits for user’s input (it doesn’t really matter how it’s being done at the moment). Once the user supplies some input and presses the enter key I get the buffer and run it. Now, it should be clear that the code which Python runs is in that same thread of the console, which I created. Can you see the problem? Ok, maybe not yet.

Some of the commands you can run are wrappers for IDA commands, just like the somewhat embedded IDC scripting in IDA, you have all those functions, but this time in Python. Suppose that you try to access an instruction to get its mnemonic from Python, but this time you do it from a different thread while the unspoken contract with IDA plugin is that whatever you do, you do it in run() function time, and unforetunately this is not the case, and cannot be the case ever, since it is an interactive console that waits for your input and should be ready anytime. If you just try to run SDK commands from the other (console) thread then you experience mysterious crashes and unexplained weird bugs, which is a big no no, and cannot be forgiveable for a product like this, of course.

Now that we know the problem we need to hack a solution. I could have done a very nasty hack, that each time the user runs something in Python, I simulate the hotkey for the plugin and then my plugin’s run() will be called from IDA’s context and there I will look at some global info which will instruct me what to run, and later on I need to marshal back the result to the Python’s (console) thread somehow. This is all possible, but com’on this is fugly.

I read the SDK upside down to find some way to get another callback, which I can somehow trigger whenever I want, in order to run from IDA’s context, but hardly I found something good and at the end nothing worked properly and it was too shakey as well.

Just to note that if you call a function from the created thread, most of the times it works, but when you have some algorithm running heavily, you get crashes after a short while. Even something simple like reading some info of an instruction in a busy loop and at the same time scrolling the view might cause problems.

Then I decided it’s time to do it correctly without any hacks at all. So what I did was reading in MSDN and looking for ways to run my own code at another thread’s context. Alternatively, maybe I could block IDA’s thread while running the functions from my own thread, but it doesn’t sound too clever, and there’s no really easy way to block a thread. And mind you that I wanted a simple and clean solution as much as possible, without crafting some Assembly code, etc. ;)

So one of the things that jumped into my mind was APC, using the function QueueUserAPC, which gets among other params an HTHREAD, which is exactly what I needed. However, the APC will get to run on the target thread only when it is in an alertable state. Which is really bad, because most UI threads are never in that state. So off I went to find another idea. Though this time I felt I got closer to the solution I wanted.

Later on a friend tipped me to check window messages. Apparently if you send a message to another window, which was created by the target thread (if the thread is a UI one and has windows, of course we assume that in IDA’s case and it’s totally ok), the target thread will dispatch that window’s window-procedure in its own context. But this is nothing new for me or you here, I guess. The thing was that I could create a window as a child of IDA’s main window and supply my own window-procedure to that window. And whenever a message is received at this window, its window-procedure gets to run in IDA’s thread’s context! (and rather not the one which created it). BAM mission accomplished. [Oh and by the way, timers (SetTimer) work the same way, since they are implemented as messages after all.]

After implementing this mechanism for getting to run in original’s IDA’s context, just like the contract wants, everything runs perfectly. To be honest, it could easily have not worked because it’s really dependent on the way IDA works and its design, but oh well. :)

About this tool, I am going to release it (as a source code) in the upcoming month. It is called Pyda, as a cool abbreviation for Python and IDA. More information will be available when it is out.

My Turn on the IPhone

Friday, July 25th, 2008

I tried adding some feature to the IPhone, and therefore I decided that I will do it my way, an in-memory patch, rather than on-disk patch. The reason I went for memory patching is simple, version 2 of IPSW contains code signing. Why should I smash my head against the wall trying to remove that code signing checks where I can easily do anything I want in runtime? Although, I read somewhere that you can sys-call something and disable the checks, they also said it makes the system a bit shaky… and later on I learnt there is a way to sign your own code, or existing patched files using ldid.

The thing is, I started my coding on beta 3 of version 2, and there everything worked well and wasn’t long time before my code work as expected. Then I updated my IPhone to the final second version and first thing I tried was my patch to know it doesn’t work. Now since there are no debuggers for the IPhone are really problematic, and except GDB, the other two I heard of are not free (DataRescue’s and DebuggerX).

Ok, to be honest, debuggers won’t even work because you can’t attach them to some of the tasks, this is since there is a new feature in OSX called ‘PT_DENY_ATTACH’, which simply means, no debugger can attach to this task, and if there is something currently attached, then detach it… This feature is implemented in the ptrace function, which lacks other important features, like reading and writing fro and to memory or getting registers’ values, etc. Of course, there are other ways to bypass those problems, and if you look well, you can find some resources about it.

Anyway, back to the story, I had to spot in my (long long) code what was wrong. After some short time I found that vm_protect failed. Another frustrating thing was to spot that failure in my code, because I didn’t have any way to print to debug (ala DebugView) or printf, or anything. I was kinda doomed, I had to crash the task in order to know that my code reached some point, and each time move the crash further a long the code, this is really lame, I know. Maybe if I had more knowledge with Linux/BSD/OSX I could track it down quicker. Hey, if you still got an idea how to do it next time, please drop a line, heh?

So once I knew the failing code, I tried to fix it, but actually I didn’t know what was wrong. The vm_protect returned something like ‘protection error’, and hell this doesn’t say much. I got really crazy at some point, that I used that same call on my own code block, and that failed too. I didn’t know what to do, I kept playing with that shit for hours :( and nothing came up to my mind. Then I left it and went to sleep with a bad mood (I hate when it happens, usually I keep on trying until I make it, but it was 6am in the morning already…) So later the next day, I decided I will read more in the MAN, and nothing special there, it only shows the parameters, the return value, bla bla, etc. By that time, I was sure that Apple touched something in the code related to vm_protect somehow, that was my hunch. The idea to RE the kernel and this function to see what was changed from beta 3 to the final version crossed my mind, not once. But I knew that I was missing something simple and I should not go that far, after all it’s a usermode API.

As stuck as I was, I googled for as much as possible information on this vm_protect and other OSX code snippets. Eventually I hit something interesting that used vm_protect and used another flag that I didn’t know that exists in OSX. The flag name is ‘vm_prot_copy’. This might finish the story for you if you know it. Otherwise, it means that when you try to write to a page, it will make a copy of that same page particulary for the requesting task and then let you write to it. This is used in many operating systems, when some file (code usually) is being loaded from disk, and the OS wants to optimize memory, it maps the same physical page of that code/data to all tasks which loaded that file. Then if you just want to write to that page, you are forbidden, of course. Here comes the COW (copy on write ) to save us.

The annoying thing is that since the documentation sucks I didn’t find this vm_prot_copy anywhere. I even took a look in the header files, where the ‘vm_prot_execute’ for instance, was defined, and didn’t see this extra flag. Only after I knew the solution I came back to that file again and I found this flag to be declared almost in the end of the file, LOL. The cool thing, which came too late, that Cydia had some notes regard ‘how to port applications from earlier versions to final version’ and they wrote something about NX and protections, though they didn’t say anything directly about this COW thingy…

It was kinda a surprise to see that I had to specify such a low level flag. As I come from the Windows world mostly, there you don’t have to specify such a thing when you try to change some page’s protection and write to it. Therefore I didn’t expect it to be the case in other OS’s.

Just wanted to share this frustrating story and the experience of how fun (or not) it is to code for the IPhone.

Anti-Unpacker Tricks

Friday, July 18th, 2008

Peter Ferrie, a former employee of Symantec, who now works for MS wrote a paper about Anti Unpacker tricks. I was really fascinated reading that paper. There were so many examples in there for tricks that still work nowadays. Some I knew already some were new to me, he covers so many tricks. The useful thing is that every trick has a thorough description and a code snippet (mostly Assembly). So now it becomes one of the most valueable papers in the subject and you should really read it to get up to date. The paper can be found here.

One idea I that I really like from the paper, is something that Peter himself found, that you can use ReadFile (or WriteProcessMemory) to override a memory block so no software breakpoints will be raised when you execute it. But on a second thought, why a simple memcpy won’t do the same trick?

If you guys remember the Tiny PE challenge I posted 2 years ago in Securiteam.com, then Peter was the only one who kicked my ass with a version of 232 byts,  where I came with 274 bytes. But no worries, after a long while I came back with a version of 213(!) bytes (over here) and used some new tricks. Today I still wait for Peter’s last word…

Have fun